Some thoughts on the CUD and other opposition parties
Antony Shaw, Addis Ababa, 12.1.2005
One of the more surprising elements in debates on recent events in Addis Ababa
has been the almost total acceptance of the CUD's own evaluations and
pronouncements at face value. There has been little attempt to evaluate the
CUD's make up or the accuracy of its claims. The debate is almost always seen in
terms of the CUD despite the fact that the CUD is only a part of the opposition
to the EPRDF; and despite the apparent and frequent assumptions of CUD leaders
to the contrary, both the UEDF and the OFDM are significant and independent
elements of the political equation.
The first point about the CUD is that it is a coalition, and despite recent
efforts to merge into a single party, a far from united coalition. Indeed, the
very attempt to merge looks implausible from the outset when the title of the
new organization includes the word coalition, and in fact appears to have
induced a new split within the organization. This, perhaps, helps to explain the
differing classifications of its leadership. These range from "well-known,
highly educated, Western-oriented sophisticates. as liberal as any Ethiopian
politician can plausibly be expected to be" (Professor Clapham) to the rather
more plausible "right wing populist urban movement" (Professor Pausewang), not
it might be noted, a party. Highly educated and liberal may have some resonance
in terms of Rainbow and EUDP-Medhin, but it has much less relevance for the CUD
as a whole or more especially for the AEUP. The divergence underlines one of the
most obvious points about the CUD - its disparity. It has some "highly educated,
Western sophisticates"(a rather patronizing term, surely?), and some of its
leaders certainly fall within such categories as "..heavily intellectual and
urban-based.[with] academics...well to the fore, but also businessmen, medical
doctors and other professionals." (Clapham). Others do not.
The CUD is, of course, composed of four separate parties that came together last
year for the election. The four components of the CUD, usually referred to as
Kinijit, are: the All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), chairman Hailu Shawel;
Rainbow Ethiopia - Movement for Democracy and Social Justice (Kestedamena),
headed by Dr. Berhanu Nega, Mayor elect for Addis Ababa, and Professor Mesfin
Wolde Mariam; the small Ethiopian Democratic League, chairman Chekol Getahnun;
and the Ethiopian United Democratic Party-Medhin (EUDP-Medhin), itself the
product of four earlier mergers. EUDP-Medhin is headed by Dr. Admassu Gebeyheu,
though he has been ill for much of the year and its most prominent personality
is Lidetu Ayelew, previously second vice-chairman of CUD.
Of these the two main parties are AEUP (Hailu Shawel) and EUDP-Medhin (Admassu
Gebeyheu). They represent separate, essentially personalized, lines of descent
from a single source - the All Amhara Peoples organisation set up by Professor
Asrat in 1992. The rump of the AAPO itself provides another third strand of
Amhara politics. AAPO supporters claim that AAPO was largely founded as a party
to defend the Amhara that were specifically being targeted by the EPRDF at the
time. It then received substantial support from the group of over 40 Addis Ababa
University lecturers, nearly all Amhara, who did not have their contracts
renewed or who were sacked following opposition to the referendum on Eritrea in
April 1993.
The CUD itself was set up last year as part of opposition efforts to put
together a broad anti-government coalition to oppose the EPRDF in the May
elections. It followed efforts the year before in Washington to bring the Amhara
parties into a grand anti-government coalition, the UEDF,AEUP and EDUP
originally joined only to walk out a few months later. There was some divergence
over policy but all accounts suggest the issue of the chairmanship was the most
critical factor. In essence, Hailu Shawel and other Amharas were not prepared to
accept the continued leadership of Dr.Beyene Petros and Dr. Merara Gudina. After
this effort foundered, Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam played the major role in
organizing the CUD, using the Rainbow party he founded together with Dr. Berhanu
Nega as a basis, in order to provide a largely Amhara alternative to the non-Amhara
UEDF parties.
From the beginning there were problems between the two larger parties in the
CUD, the AEUP, and the EDUP-Medhin, though in fact friction between Hailu Shawel
and Lidetu Ayalew long predates the formation of the CUD. Both were originally
members of the AAPO. Hailu became vice- president but split the party when he
was not elected president following Professor Asrat's death, taking a majority
of members with him. He was chosen as chairman of this fraction in 2000, and
changed the name to AEUP in 2002. Its leadership certainly does include some
whose views can only be described as hard-line Amhara chauvinism, as well as
members of the former administration and Derg supporters, many if not most in
the Diaspora. They have provided significant financing for the AEUP, and for CUD
as whole from the US.
Lidetu, who was one time head of AAPO's Youth Wing, also left AAPO, and
subsequently played a major role in the creation of the Ethiopian Democratic
Party that finally emerged last year, after several mergers of its own, as the
EDUP-Medhin. The acquisition of one faction of a much-divided -Medhin has had
the effect of widening EDP support base significantly beyond its former Amhara
core with the addition of a significant number of non-Amhara intellectuals.
The ideological difference between the two AAPO off-shoots (AEUP and EDUP-Medhin)
has never been significant, both holding an essentially similar critique of the
TPLF's approach to ethnic federalism. They reflect the variant of Ethiopian
nationalism that Professor Clapham regards as strongest among Amharas but also
reflects a wider constituency in the country at large. Ethiopian nationalism,
however, is not something confined to the CUD despite CUD propaganda; it is
shared by numerous other parties and Ethnic groups including for any impartial
observer the EPRDF and even Tigreans!
In fact, while the AEUP and EUDP-Medhin have remained in competition for Amhara
support, personality differences have underlined the difficulties of working
together. If nothing else, the age difference has affected relations between
Hailu Shawel (over 70) and Lidetu Ayelew (36). They have never worked well
together. The split finally came at the end of October, shortly before the
arrest of most CUD leaders. Lidetu was not one of them. He and his main ally,
Mushe Semu, also a CUD executive committee member, had been suspended from the
CUD on October 28, largely because they had resisted
Hailu Shawel's insistent attempts to push the merger of the four parties through
without sufficient consultation. A day later, some of EUDP-Medhin's central
committee was calling Hailu Shawel's leadership of CUD "dictatorial,
conspiratorial, factionist and obstinate".
In fact, open disagreements within CUD started almost immediately after the
disputed May elections. Lidetu, at the time official party spokesman, opposed
CUD participation in the proposed election complaints procedure, arguing that it
would be useless and merely involve the CUD in what were essentially fake
procedures. He resigned as party spokesman when the CUD did decide to take part,
amid allegations by both sides within the party that the other had leaked
information to the public. Other major disputes arose over whether the CUD
should participate in parliament, over the proposed merger to turn the CUD into
the CUDP, and over Hailu Shawel's (largely successful) attempts to turn the CUD
into his personal fiefdom.
There are also various regional factors that might be built into any analysis of
the CUD, not least the Wollo/Lasta element in the EUDP-Medhin leadership. Lidetu
Ayelew comes from the same village in northern Wollo as Dr. Admassu's wife, Dr.
Mulualem Takegne, also a member of the EUDP-Medhin central committee. There is
no space here to look at this further except to note that there have been some
suggestions that this element in EUDP-Medhin is attempting to provide a
replacement for the regional role played, in recent years, by Wag/Lasta elements
in the ANDM; and to note that a significant element in Hailu Shawel's support
comes from Gojjam and northern Shoa.
The EUDP-Medhin itself is also a coalition of interests. Originally,
representing the more intellectual element in the AAPO, it concentrated on
trying to build up a base in Addis Ababa, and with considerable success, winning
some seats in the 2000 election and mobilizing considerable support from that
base for this election. Indeed, it did far better in Addis Ababa than any other
section of the CUD. This was partly because it had acquired the charismatic
figure of Lidetu Ayelew who gained his reputation in the student demonstrations
that preceded the riots in Addis Ababa in April 2001.
In fact, EDUP-Medhin's successes in the election for the Addis Ababa City
Council led to some distinctly sharp exchanges within the CUD central council
when it became clear how the votes had divided up, both for Addis Ababa
parliamentary members and for the city council. Neither Berhanu Nega, chairman
of Rainbow, nor Dr. Admassu Gebeyheu, chairman of EUDP-Medhin, stood for
parliament; both confined their aspirations to the Addis Ababa council. The
EUDP-Medhin won fourteen of the parliamentary seats for Addis Ababa, compared to
four for Rainbow, four for the AEUP and one for the Small EDL. EUDP-Medhin also
took nearly half of the city council seats, 64 out of 135. It was much better
placed than the AEUP, largely Amhara supported, and Rainbow with substantial
Gurage backing, to attract the very extensive protest vote against the EPRDF
from all nationalities that manifested itself in the election in Addis Ababa.
Without EUDP-Medhin, CUD support in Addis Ababa would have been no more than
marginal; it would not have won control of the city council.
One effect of the vote for EUDP-Medhin in Addis Ababa was a dispute over who
should be mayor. There had been a strong pre-election presumption that Dr.
Berhanu Nega was the most obvious candidate. After the election, there were a
number of heated discussions over several weeks before agreement was reached for
Berhanu to become the mayor and Admassu to take the position of his deputy.
Indeed, if Dr. Admassu had not been ill, as he still is, many believe he could
have successfully insisted on taking the position of mayor. It certainly
required a lot of discussion before he and EUDP-Medhin gave way on the issue.
When it came to the issue of participation in parliament, however, both Admassu
and Berhanu lost out to Hailu Shawel. Berhanu, like a majority of the Addis
Ababa CUD MPs-elect wanted CUD to take up its seats. Berhanu's line was: we have
won Addis Ababa and we should get on with the job. However, the government's
insistence that this would only be possible if the CUD joined parliament made
this impossible. Berhanu originally supported the concept that elected MPs and
City Councilors would be betraying their constituents if they failed to take
their seats. The counter-argument from Hailu Shawel and other AEUP leaders was
that it would be a betrayal of constituents to take up seats in a parliament
elected by fraud. To a majority of the EUDP-Medhin's "western-educated
sophisticates" this was nonsense, but they were out-maneuvered by Hailu and his
hard-line minority support in the CUD.
In fact, there were two points when the CUD came very close to accepting the
idea of participation in parliament. On both occasions, it was the AEUP, and
Hailu Shawel in particular, which played the major role in preventing it. The
CUD was essentially divided on the issue and there was a lot of serious debate.
Hailu led the rejectionist wing. Some of the more liberal (largely EUDP-Medhin)
elements in the CUD though it would strengthen their hands to call public
meetings to get support for attending parliament. The assumption was that there
would be popular support for this as the public had voted for them. The first
few meetings were held in Bole and similar areas. There was an overwhelming
support for going into parliament. Hailu was appalled, and rapidly organized a
counter move, shifting the meetings into kebeles in the mercato area and
bringing in organized gangs of unemployed youngsters to ensure the results were
against attendance. Within a few weeks, the liberal wing was deploring its own
stupidity in trying to be too democratic.
It was during this period that Hailu Shawel, who had gone to the US for medical
treatment and to fund-raise from a Diaspora that was becoming impatient with the
CUD failure to deliver on its promise of non-participation in parliament,
announced that CUD would not enter parliament. Despite his statement to
Ethiopian Review that the CUD central council unanimously supported this, the
council immediately announced in Addis Ababa that Hailu had been speaking
personally and the decision had yet to be made. Hailu rapidly returned to Addis
Ababa. Decisions in the CUD council had previously been taken on a simple
majority, but when it became clear that the supporters for participation would
win the day, Hailu Shawel, surprisingly with support from Berhanu Nega, forced
though a motion that serious issues had to have a 2/3rd majority. Berhanu
apparently believed that this was necessary to keep the CUD united. There is no
doubt that Berhanu Nega had originally supported the view that the CUD should
enter parliament. Outmaneuvered by rejectionists, reluctantly, and certainly
under some duress, if former colleagues are to be believed, he finally accepted
the side of confrontation and rejection in the interests of CUD unity. Another
reason for this shift may have been the dispute that opened up between
EDUP-Medhin and Rainbow over the position of mayor. In the end supporters of
participation could have mustered 51% but they couldn't manage 66% - though
according to some reports they managed to reach 65% on one vote.
In the end Hailu Shawel won the day, and the CUD stayed out, with Hailu
encouraging an alternative approach, that of non-violent demonstrations, knowing
full well, as did a number of his central council, that this would lead to
violence. The government made it quite clear after the killings in June that
there would be a similar response to any attempt to carry the struggle out on to
the streets. Rioting, of course, may raise awareness of a situation; it does not
solve it. The November riots in Addis Ababa were the ct of a class without
power, organized by politicians who, as usual, did not and would not
participate. And as always the people who took to the streets did not benefit,
nor did the organizers intend them to do so. Riots are always extremely risky
and the borderline between political violence and criminal activity is very
thin. Violence of this kind rapidly descends into being an end in itself. It is
a cliché that the unemployed and excluded living in almost total poverty with
little or no hope of improvement, may enjoy the destruction, the burning of
buses, the stoning of cars, even the deaths of policemen. The government claims
to have real evidence that some CUD leaders organized the riots, though it has
yet to produce it; it seems improbable that it has anything specific against
others including a number of editors and journalists. But whether the government
does have such evidence or not, there can be no doubt that the CUD knew exactly
what the results would be. It is not surprising that the US categorized the
November riots as a cynical and deliberate attempt to cause violence. The CUD's
irresponsibility does not of course exonerate the government for its failure to
deploy non-fatal methods of urban control or for the deaths of dozens of
civilians, any more than the CUD can disclaim responsibility for the deaths of
seven policemen and other civilians.
At the end of the day a considerable element within the CUD has remained
confused by the party's refusal to participate in parliament. Many believe that
the members they voted for should join the parliament, take up their seats and
run the Addis Ababa council. The MPs-elect themselves were divided to the point
that the CUD was on the verge of a major split before the November riots. Nearly
a third of the CUD MPs-elect had repudiated the party's boycott; in total of
over 30 had taken up their seats. According to current rumors the number has now
risen to 40, despite threats of violence made against them. The CUD leadership
was concerned enough about the trend to set up a special committee in October,
chaired by Hailu Shawel, to raise funds to provide salaries for those MPs and
City Councilors who did not take up their seats. One result of all this has been
that a considerable number of party members have been reluctant to accept some
of the subsequent CUD calls for further action, including for example the travel
ban, even the boycott of various products. Some of the calls from the Diaspora,
for"woyane" or EPRDF supporters, to be refused entry into churches, or for
government supporters to be purged from edir and ekub associations as well as
professional bodies and community organizations, have led to widespread
revulsion and disgust. Indeed, these put a rather different gloss on CUD denials
of support for anti-Tigrean policies or anti-Tigrean remarks.
The CUD does make an appeal to an Ethiopian nationalism that transcends the
creation of ethnic federalism, a view reappeared to a substantial degree during
the war with Eritrea. However, if the outpourings of its supporters are any
guide, it appeals rather more to a crude anti-Tigrean/anti-Eritrean nationalism
with substantial Amhara chauvinist overtones. The writing of many pro-CUD
intellectuals, notably Getachew Haile, and indeed, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, are
laced with extensive anti-Tigrean propaganda, much of it highly offensive. The
responses, one has to say, have been equally unpleasant.There is certainly no
real sign of any CUD attempt to appeal to those nationalities that have a
history of alienation from, or problems with, the historic Ethiopian state,
Afars, Oromos, Somalis and others, even though these are certainly not satisfied
by what the EPRDF has offered, or by the EPRDF's failure to deliver on its
promises. This is why the protest votes in Oromia and the Southern Nations, and
in Addis Ababa of course, was so substantial, but it did not go to the CUD
alone.
In the elections for State Councils, in addition to sweeping Addis Ababa with
the CUD taking all but one seat, the CUD did take a significant vote in the
Amhara region (39%), a figure that it claims should have been higher in reality.
This is true, but the figures from other regions make it clear that the impact
of the CUD elsewhere was certainly limited largely to urban areas - 11% in the
SNNP and in Beni-Shangul Gumuz; 9% in Harari and 6% in Oromia The size of the
CUD vote in some of these areas was unexpectedly high, but there is no
indication, and certainly no evidence, that the CUD could have done any better
outside the Amhara region and Addis Ababa in a fairer election. All indications
are, however, that the UEDF and the ONC would have done so.
Many Oromos who were totally opposed to the EPRDF, turned out to vote for the
OPDO for fear of a CUD victory. The CUD's appointment of Birtukan Mideksa, an
Oromo, as its first vice-chairperson, was seen a little more than tokenism.
There are no shared political values between the CUD and any Oromo parties, and
the CUD's proposed changes to the federal structure offer nothing to the Oromo
at all. As a result, one of the main reasons why a very significant element in
the OLF wants to take up Meles' offer of talks is to build a political coalition
against the CUD. It is clear a significant
element among Oromos in general, and in the OLF, would do so.
Southerners and Oromos have taken real fright against the possibility of a CUD
victory. The perception is that the CUD intention to revoke Article 39 and to
redraw the federal regional boundaries to return to something similar to the old
imperial provinces, is no more than a device to restore Amhara supremacy. A
division of Oromia into three or four provinces, even if these were all largely
Oromo, would be opposed by almost all Oromos. Even to suggest such an idea
indicates a total lack of understanding of Oromo politics. This is not in the
CUD program, and the allegation may well be exaggerated. It is certainly not
Rainbow or EUDP-Medhin policy, but it does appear to be the intention of some
AEUP central committee members. There is a similar perception over the CUD's
undoubted intention to privatize land, a policy that is strongly supported by
many international observers. Again, however, it is widely seen as a device to
restore the large Amhara landholdings of imperial days.
These perceptions largely explain why the CUD/UEDF electoral coalition broke up
so quickly. With such extensive differences of ideology and policy, it could
never have lasted for any length of time, and the UEDF and the ONC could never
have stayed in any coalition with the CUD unless there were major changes in CUD
policy over Article 39 (self-determination) and Article 40 (land ownership),
both of which the UEDF wishes to see unchanged. Ostensibly the main reason for
the break-up was that the UEDF leaders in Addis Ababa, Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merara,
decided to enter parliament. This was a decision that led several of the CUD
leaders to go round referring publicly to Dr. Beyene as "Judas". Indeed, CUD
leaders, mainly from the AEUP, have never shown much restraint in disparaging
Dr. Beyene in particular and Dr. Merara. Equally important, was the fact that
neither Dr. Beyene nor Dr. Merara was prepared to accept Hailu Shawel's attempt
to impose his authority over all the opposition.
As a result of their stance, Dr. Beyene and Dr. Marara have come a lot of
criticism from CUD supporters. A press release on October 24 from a group
claiming to represent the UEDF central committee in the US announced they had
been expelled from their positions for entering parliament after the UEDF
executive committee had voted 10 to 3 not to enter parliament on October 3rd.
Although the press release was unsigned and so ignored it is likely to have a
significant impact on the UEDF and ONC's Diaspora funding. CUD supporters in the
Diaspora have made it clear that they regard joining parliament as the act of a
traitor. Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merara have been the target of these and numerous
other personal attacks. In another display of EPRDF insensitivity, or perhaps
continued over-confidence, this had made little. The EPRDF and the government
seem determined to be unhelpful even to those who have accepted, albeit
reluctantly, the electoral results and been prepared to take their places in
parliament. Indeed, if the government continues present parliamentary policies,
the UEDF may well be forced out of parliament and back into an alliance with the
CUD.
The treatment of Dr. Merara Gudina and the ONC is a case in point. In early
September the ONC offices were vandalized and taken over by dissident members of
the party, with the police refusing to respond to requests for help.
Subsequently, the NEB apparently accepted that the dissidents led by Tolosa
Tesfaye were the legal leadership of the party, and recognized the extraordinary
general assembly held on September 22 and the central and executive committees
appointed there. And on November 17, the NEB said that it regarded Tolosa as the
leader of the ONC. Dr. Merara claims that the assembly of September 22 was held
illegally. Virtually all of the ONC's 39 MPs support Dr. Merara.
The other major problem within the CUD arose over the issue of the attempt to
merge the four component parts of CUD into one single organization. The idea,
which was Hailu Shawel's, was proposed by the AEUP and agreed in August though
with some reservations by the other parties. During the next few weeks, AEUP
demanded the process should be speeded up. The other three parties disagreed,
and EUDP-Medhin suggested the process needed to be discussed at every level not
just by executive and central committees. AEUP complicated the argument by
announcing unilaterally that it would take 45% of the membership in the
executive and central committees of the merged party. The earlier agreement had
been than AEDP and EDUP should have equal, larger shares, while Rainbow and EDL
as smaller parties should have smaller representation in the merged party. This
had seemed agreeable, and the AEUP sudden claims for the largest share did not
appeal to any of the others. AEDP claimed it had a much larger membership, more
officers, greater financial capacity with support from the Diaspora, and greater
political experience. Given the experience of the election it is clear that any
numerical claims should be treated with extreme caution. EDUP-Medhin certainly
disputed the argument, pointing out that it had been much more successful in
Addis Ababa and it therefore must have far greater support there than AEDP or
any other party. One major critic of the idea of a rushed merger was Lidetu
Ayelew, the CUD 2nd vice-chairman; one of the reasons why he had left the AEUP/AAPO
some years earlier has been concern over just this issue of Hailu Shawel's
determination to exercise complete control. EUDP-Medhin concerns were reinforced
by suggestions from Hailu Shawel supporters that their leader should be given
emergency powers by the CUD council, including a veto power over all CUD
executive committee decisions, allowing the chairman to make all decision
himself should the council be unable to meet.
Professor Mesfin attempted to mediate the dispute from his sick-bed. He was
annoyed enough with both sides to make public reference to people with an
"undisciplined ambition for power", without specifying to whom he was referring
to. Many people though he meant both Hailu and Lidetu. The debate rapidly spread
into the public domain, with both sides producing pamphlets and papers using
official party stamps to support allegations of egoism against supporters of
Hailu Shawel or fifth columnists (sego gebotch) against those who backed Lidetu.
Other allegations referred to "highly secretive and machiavellian" groups,
"extremist agendas", and the orchestration of "undemocratic and dangerous
moves".
Following an EUDP-Medhin general assembly in September, the EUDP-Medhin's
executive committee was mandated to take the process of the merger slowly. By 10
votes to 7, the committee originally supported Lidetu's arguments that the party
should be careful not to be pushed into something by Hailu. Hailu was furious at
the implied criticism of his policies and by the check to his own plans. At a
meeting of the CUD executive committee the next day, he demanded immediate
agreement on the merger, and no more discussion. He said the CUD would push
ahead with the merger within two days, even without
EDUP-Medhin. This confirmed the view of many EUDP-Medhin members that the AEUP
was intending to merge at their expense, a point stressed by Lidetu. However, a
browbeaten EUDP-Medhin executive committee eventually fell into line, apparently
in the interests of overall CUD unity, and reversed its position, agreeing to an
immediate merger by 12 votes to 5. A day later the CUD's executive committee,
with Hailu Shawel in full control, announced that Lidetu and Mushe were
suspended. In support of this, a petition for Lidetu's removal was suddenly
produced. It allegedly came from his constituency and supposedly contained
75,000 signatures. One does not have to be a supporter of the EPRDF, or of
Lidetu, to find this highly improbable.
For the few weeks preceding this, Lidetu had been subject to a highly unpleasant
smear campaign in a number of pro-CUD papers, with claims that he'd been holding
talks with senior government officials, taking money from Sheikh Mohamed Al-Amoudi,
the owner of the Sheraton Hotel, and that he had sold out to the government.
There was no evidence for any of this, although the fact that he and his
supporters were not arrested with the other CUD leaders in early November added
fuel to the rumors. The allegations have continued with a recent claim in
Ethiopian Review (November 24): "it is
now clear that Ato Lidetu has joined the EPRDF's war of destruction on CUD".
There is in fact a clear pattern of demonizing anyone who disagrees with the CUD
leadership or with any if its policies, and rather more evidence for this than
the reverse. Professor Mesfin in a recent letter attacking the donor ambassadors
for urging the CUD to attend parliament, rather pointedly looking back to the
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s and its atrocities and asking who the
grandfather of the Italian ambassador might have been.
The arrest of Hailu Shawel and other CUD leaders on November 1 and 2 has, of
course, changed the situation, and certainly affected EUDP-Medhin policies. At
the moment, EUDP-Medhin and Lidetu are no closer to the government than before.
Both he and the party remain as critical as ever of governmentpolicies, of the
arrests and of the government's heavy-handedness in dealing with the riots.
Nevertheless, there must be a strong possibility that Lidetu will soon leave the
CUD formally and take a majority of the EUDP-Medhin with him. He has himself has
made it clear in the past he would prefer to join parliament if circumstances
permit, though this remains politically impossible while the government
threatens treason trials for the CUD leaders. Lidetu currently insists he will
not join parliament. It is noticeable however that there are very few EUD-Medhin
leaders among those detained. Equally, EUDP-Medhin is it is now in a position to
make a bid to take over leadership of the Amhara opposition from Hailu Shawel
and the AEDP. It is likely to take the opportunity, irrespective of whether
Hailu and other CUD leaders are put on trial. Lidetu has now called for a
general assembly of the party to clarify its stance, to take place within a week
or two, though this may depend upon being able to get party documents back from
the police who ransacked EUDP-Medhin offices at the time of the riots.
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