1. Introduction
This paper is divided into three sections. The first part deals with
the salient themes and features of globalisation: its meanings, flaws and
contradictions. The second part involves critical examination of the practice
of global power and democratic discourse. Finally, conclusions are drawn
on the fate of African people and their struggles for survival in the face
of global agendas.
2. What is Globalisation and How it Came About?
No one will do justice to the themes as broad as global power, democracy
and profit in Africa in a brief paper like this. It is possible however
to summarise their salient features and to see some of the impacts
on Africa. Even from Africa, there is no intention to cover the whole continent
except concentrating on countries that are referred to being led by ‘new
bloc’ of leaders.
To begin with, globalisation is a process involving economic, political,
cultural, and technological aspects of contemporary world. As an economic
phenomenon, it points to the expansion of international trade and investment
as well as fast mobility of international credit, currency flows, speculation
and debt. These factors worked to intensify the incorporation or ‘integration’
of economies. Another important feature of the global economy is the growth
of Trans-national and multinational corporations most of which are owned
by and based on western nations. Among themselves, they control a significant
share of global capital, and wield substantial economic power, sometimes
with a shift of influence away from national governments and local communities.
Globalisation is political in the sense that the dominant powers
insist on the adoption of certain versions of their policies and values
(for example, the adoption of liberal democracy and opening up of economies).
This meant national states increasingly restructuring their position and
their responsibilities in relation to both the global capitalism and to
the local economies and societies. This tendency towards homogenisation
of politics seeks to form a world government with singular security, army,
and judiciary branches with most of its important institutions located
in the west. Globalisation in this sense is referred to as hegemonisation.
Globalisation also impacts cultures. It tends to promote homogeneity
towards western and American values and influences. In this sense, some
see globalisation as westernisation or even Americanisation. They cite,
among others, instances of expansion of coca cola, Mcdonalds, and the rock-and-roll
music relayed by adverts, radio, and global satellite television. Such
expansion, they argue, happens at the expense of local cultures that are
the sources of diversities.
All the above are made possible by technical advances especially
in information technology that makes use of computers and satellite communication.
It is common today to hear of electronic economy and electronic money.
Instantaneous communication is possible for those who afford the modern
day gadgets such as television, personal computers, digital instruments,
and the like. (Yet it remains to be seen if these make any sense to an
African villager whose priorities are access to pure water, to decent health
and education facilities). In this way globalisation is redefining the
significance of physical distance, territorial boundaries and economic,
political and cultural space. Interaction is increasing among the local,
national, regional and global actions. Such being the elements of globalisation,
it is necessary to ask how it came about.
Globalisation became a glaring image of contemporary world towards the
end of Cold War. But its foundations had been on the making for a long
time, going back to centuries. In the period following the Second World
War, the winners of that war, namely America and the allied states, agreed
to establish a framework that came to dominate global financial and economic
arrangements. The best examples include the formation of the Bretton Woods
Institutions (i.e. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)
as well as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (now World Trade Organisation)
with the aim of deregulating economies and integrating trade.
The period following the Second World War witnessed tremendous expansion
of capital whereby national economies came to be dominated by giant Trans-national
and multinational corporations. In the political sphere, advances in the
technology of war led to concerns of peace to be policed by supranational
and international bodies such as the United Nations. At the same time,
the group of seven affluent nations (G7 and sometimes called G8) came to
influence economic policies among member countries.
In Africa, it became evident in the 1970s and the 1980s that with the
growing debt crises, states were forced to undertake what are known as
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) monitored by the World Bank and
the IMF. Time and again these programmes meant devaluation, macro-economic
stabilisation, budget deficit reduction, restructuring of public sectors,
privatisation, reform of agricultural marketing and pricing policies. The
SAPs were, in general, aimed to reform economies, or in other words, prepare
them for integration into the global market. To qualify for foreign aid
and credit, countries were required to fulfill the conditions of reform.
Coming back to most recent times, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the collapse of the Soviet communism in 1991 ushered in the end of
the Cold War. Some called it the ‘end of history’ and others referred to
it as the end of ideology. There was a wave of optimism and hope that the
bi-polar world was to change for better. The mood of optimism was captured
in the buzzword of New World Order whose basis was said to include:
3. Global Power: Flaws and Contradictions
The United States of America, being the military and economic super
power left off the Cold War rivalry, quickly assumed the role to oversee
the new order. It declared free markets, liberal democracy and respect
for human rights as the bases for its foreign policy. But the very notion
of global power has never been free from flaws and contradictions.
The first problem relates to impartiality and conflict of interest.
Many doubt if any global power, not least the USA, could be an impartial
judge on global affairs. Like any national government, it acts according
to its own strategic and national interest. Whenever these interests depart
from the outlined principles, it is bound to break them. For example, if
the U.S. perceives a particular regime is perceived to be in favour of
its interest, or friendly, it may qualify for support regardless of whether
it is dictatorial and authoritarian, whether it abuses human rights and
violates international norms and standards. This is the case in supporting
regimes such as Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire, South Africa’s apartheid regime,
and largely today’s ‘New’ bloc of leaders in Africa.
Today the old competition for spheres of influence is revitalised in
different forms. What remains of the Cold War thinking still guides the
post-Cold War foreign policy. And wherever there is a break with the past,
be it in Congo or Somalia, be it in Uganda or Rwanda, the U.S. sees fit
to capture an opportune moment not to be lost to competitors. The calculus
considers the size of the population as potential customers. The policy
is also to deal with individuals, be it leaders or local elite including
traditional chiefs, in an act that resembles old colonisism based on indirect
rule. There is also unproportionate emphasis on 'civil society' with the
intent of baypassing the institutional and traditional authority systems
that are proven to defend the locales. Moreover, the 'civil' groups of
individuals are positively encouraged to alienate themselves from their
political defenders, their own political organsiations, be it their national
liberation organisations or any institutions that link them to their local
environment.
Added to this is the nature of the global economic environment, which
is hardly harmonious. It produces competition and conflicts even among
the western trading blocs. There are rival trading blocs as in NAFTA, EU,
and in ASEAN. The recent trade dispute between the USA and Europe over
banana trade from South America is the case in point. Trade often involves
a tendency to protect ones market while attempting to penetrate other markets.
The free trade agenda is often pushed by dominant powers, while the weak
are on the receiving end.
The second problem is about the capacity of any sole super power
to play the role of the world’s police force. This mainly relates to the
economic capacity of the superpower to sustain global military role. In
the case of the USA, observers note its failure in Somalia and events such
as genocide in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, wars in Congo, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc… in the 90s. They argue that the New World
Order is but a New World disorder which unpredictable, risky and even more
dangerous.
The third problem with global power ideas is that of the imposition
of a certain version of western liberal democracy, that of competitive
multi-party democracy, engenders anomalies. In communities and economies
based predominantly on agriculture, where the masses of people live in
rural areas, where the western style classes (workers and capitalists)
are absent, and where the post-colonial state politics has been based more
on hegemonic paradigm, such western imposition is bound to yield conflicts.
Today the ready-made recipes for conflicts are not the old ideological
difference as much as ethnic differences. Where the multi-party elections
take place, they end up creating ethnic hegemony or alignments, with all
forms of irregularities. Nowhere the fallacies of such a persuasion have
proven pervasive as in Ethiopia. And sadly enough such regimes have been
viewed positively by foreign officials despite unsettling flaws and their
pernicious impacts on the populations subjected to their rule.
Fourth, there is a widespread belief that such global hegemony
is sustained at the expense of rising global inequality, worsening environmental
degradation (as in pollution, global worming, unsustainable exploitation
of resources) and human rights violations. Indeed, as globalisation proceeds,
the poorest sections of the world are facing increasing marginalisation,
not outside but within the embrace of the very global capitalism. The statistics
are gloomy. The share of the poorest fifth of the world’s population in
global income has dropped from 2.3% to 1.4% over the past 10 years. But
the proportion taken by the richest has risen from 70% to 85%. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, 20 countries have lower incomes per head in real terms than they
did two decades ago. The rising global inequality is a manifestation of
the global world today. In the face of global capitalism, Africans appear
powerless, vulnerable, and unequal partners of a system that destroys local
cultures. By creating winners and losers, sometimes by unjust manners,
it worsens the lot of the impoverished. While a decided few remain on the
fast track to material prosperity, the majorities are condemned to a life
of misery and despair.
Worrying is also the situation of human rights and attendant refugee
problem. Badly affected are the vulnerable groups in society, the young
and the old who are conditioned to endless wars and endemic diseases. With
these broad critical comments, it is time to review what has happened with
the ‘new leaders’ and democracy in Africa.
4. ‘New bloc leaders’, democracy and profit
in Africa
At recent times, a lot has been said about ‘Africa’s New Bloc’ or ‘new
leaders’ or even the ‘new generation of leaders’. The terms referred to
a block of leader perceived to be a group of people in power with similar
political aims and interests acting together on certain issues. The term
‘new generation of leaders’ is a misnomer and sweeping. It refers to regimes
as various as Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea. For all what
is known, the notion of new leadership is a remote imposition. What is
new about this new bloc?
-
The leaders have been guerrilla fighters and their regimes seized power
after protracted war and seem to prefer doing politics by other means,
i.e. relying on force. In a sense, most of them appeared to represent a
break from the past rulers most of whom had been corrupt, autocratic and
militaristic as Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, and Mengistu Haile Mariam.
The new bloc is considered better by comparison with the past. Most, if
not all, claimed democratic credentials.
-
The ‘new bloc’ was also projected to represent something ‘new’ of the post-colonial
order. In some instances, they replaced regimes that came to power in the
1950s and 1960s as the result of flag independence (called decolonisation
wave) which achieved little better than the colonial order. In that sense,
the new leaders were seen to represent something national, something local,
and something authentic. Uganda’s Yuweri Museveni in particular is popularised
along these lines.
-
More importantly, most of these regimes appeared to avail opportunity for
profit seeking capitalism by accepting economic reform programmes approved
and supervised by the IMF. Some, however, showed signs of doubt on the
conditions attached with foreign aid.
In the course of time and in reality what has become of the new bloc can
be seen from the wider perspective of global power, democratic discourse
and search for global profits. During his visit to African countries, President
Clinton articulated America’s foreign policy goals in relation to Africa.
He argued that the US seeks to promote:
- Economic reform and Africa’s integration into the global economy,
- Progress on human rights and democratic transition, and,
- Re-establish political stability and effective governance in war-torn
states.
Now let us see each theme separately.
5. Appraisal of ‘new bloc leaders’, democracy
and profits
First, experience with economic reform is mixed with various
effects. It is common to hear countries reporting positive annual GDP growth
rates. One simple problem with such aggregate figures is their inadequacy
to capture social and political costs of any reform programme. The IMF-sponsored
adjustment measures implied reduction of public spending. The social sectors
like health and education can be badly affected as the result of cuts with
direct effects on local populations.
Another element of economic reform is privatisation of formerly state
owned sectors. The Ethiopian regime underwent privatisation but the scheme
itself and the running of the economy has benefited the ruling regime and
its supporters more than any one else. Here a web of companies associated
with the ruling TPLF/EPRDF regime emerged while other ‘businessmen have
either been dismissed or have been forced to forfeit their licenses through
loss of business and their exclusion from participating in the privatisation
scheme’. (Pollock, in Hameso et al, 1997, p.95).
For the majority of the population, mass deprivation, displacement and
expropriation became ready made outcomes with undue exposure to unfavourable
natural and man-made forces. Contrary to the claims of the government,
the issue of sustainable development is as remote as ever. Right now Ethiopia
needs food hand out. The debt problem is overwhelming with outstanding
amount of $10 billion, some of which was irresponsibly borrowed to make
wars and violence. The debt burden per person is huge. To make matters
worse, the current war with another new bloc country and the associated
military expenditure effectively puts on hold whatever could be told about
economic reform in Ethiopia.
Regarding aid versus trade, the U.S. focus is on trade though debt relief
is considered recently. A bill was proposed to enhance U.S. trade and investment
in Africa. But it has not always been successful. Beneath these declared
goals lies the pursuit of profit and national self-interest.
Second, the other challenging goals are human rights and democracy.
In reality these goals were seen to clash. Where a regime is undemocratic
and does not respect human rights, but still gives way for profits, then
the choice becomes one of promoting human rights vis a vis profits, or
pursuing ethical foreign policy vis a vis accepting the dictates of market
competition. In most cases, it is the latter, which guides action. Again
the Ethiopian regime is a case in point. Several critics maintained that
the regime cannot pass for a democracy. There is a large body of evidence
on the human rights violations by the same regime. Yet it has received
more aid from western powers than any country in SSA except South Africa.
This shows that it is possible, or even common, for a global power to
pursue its own national strategic and economic interests with little or
no attention to social, political and ecological outcomes. This will fuel
conflicts and may led to increasingly unstable and dangerous situation.
For the disgruntled, the question becomes more than one of human rights;
it becomes one of survival right. And the African State becomes nothing
more than a client to global pillage.
Third come the notions of good governance and political stability.
Theoretically, reference to good governance includes aversion to corruption
in public life, transparency, accountability to the local populace and
the ensuing legitimacy of political rule. The latter is supposed to be
ensured by periodic elections and transfer of power. In reality, taking
the case of the new leadership rhetoric, we see that the U.S, foreign policy
created anomalies. Corruption is reported daily in countries like Uganda,
Congo, Kenya and Ethiopia. Visibly autocratic and dictatorial leaders were
acclaimed for good governance. Meles of Ethiopia was chosen for an award
a few years back for good governance. (The Economist, 16 August 1997).
Such actions leave many doubtful of the very definition of good and bad
governance and who is the judge.
On the other hand, preoccupation with stability means sticking to the
status quo. Depending on circumstances, it means resisting social changes
even when they are due. It means supporting authoritarian regimes that
crush opposition. It meant supporting tyrants who violate human rights.
The global power abhors conflicts, particularly ones that it dislikes.
One hears time and again of the so-called conflict management, or peacekeeping
initiatives. One example has been joint military training initiatives with
counties like Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Now all these regimes have
big fights in their hands.
Therefore most of the acclaimed countries are the ones most stuck in
conflict. Uganda fights protracted civil war on the northern parts of its
territory. Uganda and Rwanda support rebel movements in Congo. The Kabila
government has many supporting states on its side. The whole Horn is a
place of chaos. Somalia has no central government despite the U.S. military
intervention in 1992 only to withdraw two years later. The border war between
Ethiopia and Eritrea engulfs almost all countries in the Horn.
6. Conclusions
Given these situations, we would arrive at a conclusion that the global
power idea seems to be very uncertain, hardly sustainable and even harmful
to Africa. There are certain aspects I will reiterate in a way of conclusion:
The first relates to the position of the African State. The state in
Africa has become increasingly alien and harmful to the very population
it rules over. It is incapable of defending the people from internal and
external barbarism. Instances are that it has become part of the problem.
Preyed in many directions, people are losing their survival mechanisms
to decision making from far away places. On the part of the states, the
pressure to open up and to be part of the global pillage is immense. The
pervious economic mismanagement is used as a case for unquestioning surrender
of policy making on social, political, and economic fields. Yet it is doubtful
if this is of any benefit to the people. You may ask: What happens if a
country or a region opens up itself to unfettered free trade without institutional
frameworks? Common sense suggests that, under African circumstances, the
local economy may be undermined. A region that depends upon few products
to world markets is very vulnerable to shifts in prices as well as to technological
changes. (The most recent events on coffee and gold prices are the case
in point). We know that trade always needs a framework of institutions,
as do other forms of economic development. This is particularly true for
Africa which suffers from lowest levels of human well being.
The second concern is the proliferation of conflicts. For a decade now,
conflicts are showing only signs of worsening. Examples include ethnic
genocide in Rwanda followed by minority ethnic hegemony there and deportations
in Ethiopia and the death of tens of thousands this year in what many called
a crazy war with Eritrea. The media refers to these and many other conflicts
in Africa in the most familiar tone. They were reported to result from
tribalism and tribal wars or border disputes. Ethnicity and ethnic differences
are vilified as sources of conflicts. This goes well with the intent to
globalise and homogenise societies into one global culture, language and
government. No wonder if resistance, action and reaction cause more conflicts.
No wonder also if ethnicity serves as the ideology of the oppressed for
collective survival, a social safety net where the state cannot provide
even the crude necessities of life.
The rush towards homogeneity also carries the danger of extinction of
human species in the ensuing conflicts and diseases. This is particularly
so as stronger cultures push for global uniformity by imposing their own
image by nullifying the weaker ones. Lost will be the vibrancy and plurality
of approaches and the colours of diversity to be replaced by monotonous
uniformity, creating in the process outcasts, stifling creativity and multiplication
of insecurity.
The third concern is one of double standards. Human rights and democracy
form part of stated western foreign policy. But in reality they take second
seat when it comes to national interest and the search for profits. There
are discrepancies of declared policy intent and actions.
The fourth point is regarding the operation of TNCs. It is known that
in poor countries safety and environmental regulations are low or virtually
non-existent. Unless regulated such companies may sell goods that are controlled
or banned elsewhere in the West including poor quality medical drugs, and
destructive pesticides. All this indicates to ever increasing vulnerability
of the poor. Unless approached with extreme responsibility and with proper
channels of accountability, global power and global capitalism have the
capacity to corrupt globally.
Finally and in order not to finish my presentation with gloomy notes,
let me cite few positive sides to globalisation and global power.
One is the impact of communications technology. Assuming there could
be access to communication technology, campaigners and community groups
can exchange local strategies of resistance from different sides of the
globe. They can forge alliances that enable the achievement of otherwise
difficult goals. They can exchange views, they organise their thoughts
and even their people in manners that would have been difficult otherwise.
Today people in different corners of the world are aware of what is happening
to the East Timorese, the Kurdish, the Kosovars, the Tamils, the South
Sudanese, and other endangered cultural groups in the world.
The new era also ushered in the possibility to document and record what
is left of different and diverse national perspectives. There is also observable
revitalisation of local nationalisms as a response to globalising tendencies
or as the hold of older state-nations weakens. Examples abound of the revival
of local cultural identities in different parts of the world. In Brtian
devolution of power is being practised with the formation of Scotish and
Welsh national assemblies.
The issue of state sovereignty being reconsidered is another aspect.
With all its imperfections, the attempt to bring dictatorial rulers and
human rights violator regimes to account for their actions, or to question
the majority, the legitimacy and the legality of regimes suppressing and
murdering domestic populations is essential and useful.
Despite these possibilities, I leave you with the following question
to ponder. Are there any contingency plans if globalisation and global
power lead to more poverty, more illiteracy, more family and community
disintegration, and more environmental degradation and worsening violence
and conflicts? []
*The initial version of this paper
was presented to the conference held in Berlin, Germany entitled: ‘A Decade
of New Political Order and the Fate of Democracy and Peace in Africa’, July 15-18, 1999.
This article appeared in The Sidama Concern, Vol.4 No. 3, 1999
(pp.5-10)
Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article:
Hameso, Seyoum 1999. Global Power, Democracy and Profit in
Africa, The Sidama Concern, 4, 3
[online] URL: http://www.sidamaconcern.com/articles/globalisationtion.html
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